Security World keys
Using the Security World key: module-protected keys
You can use the Security World key to protect an application key that you must make available to all your users at all times. This key is called a module-protected key. Module-protected keys:
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Have no passphrase
-
Are usable by any instance of the application for which they were created, provided that this application is running on a server fitted with a hardware security module belonging to the correct Security World.
This level of protection is suitable for high-availability Web servers that you want to recover immediately if the computer resets.
Using Operator Card Sets: OCS-protected keys
An OCS belongs to a specific Security World. Only a hardware security module within the Security World to which the OCS belongs can read or erase the OCS. There is no limit to the number of OCSs that you can create within a Security World.
An OCS stores a number of symmetric keys that are used to protect the application keys. These keys are of the same type as the Security World key.
Each card in an OCS stores only a fragment of the OCS keys. You can only re-create these keys if you have access to enough of their fragments. Because cards sometimes fail or are lost, the number of fragments required to re-create the key (K) are usually less than the total number of fragments (N).
To make your OCS more secure, we recommend that you make the value of K relatively large and the value of N less than twice that of K (for example, the values for K/N being 3/5 or 5/9). This practice ensures that if you have a set of K cards that you can use to recreate the key, then you can be certain that there is no other such card set in existence.
Some applications restrict K to 1. |
Using Operator Card Sets to share keys securely
You can use OCSs to enable the same keys for use in a number of different HSMs at the same time.
If you have a non-persistent OCS, you must leave one of the cards in an appropriate card slot of each HSM. This should only be done if it is in accordance with the security policies of your organization.
To use OCS-protected keys across multiple HSMs, set:
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K to 1
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N at least equal to the number of the HSMs you want to use.
You can then insert single cards from the OCS into the appropriate card slot of each HSM to authorize the use of that key.
To issue the same OCS-protected key to a set of users, set:
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K to 1
-
N equal to the number of users.
You can then give each user a single card from the OCS, enabling those users to authorize the use of that key.
If you have created an OCS for extra security (in which K is more than half of N), you can still share the keys it protects simultaneously amongst multiple modules as long you have enough unused cards to form a K/N quorum for the additional hardware security modules. For example, with a 3/5 OCS, you can load keys onto 3 hardware security modules because, after loading the key on the first device, you still have 4 cards left. After loading the key on a second device, you still have 3 cards left. After loading the key onto a third device, you have only 2 cards left, which is not enough to create the quorum required to load the key onto a fourth device. |
If a card becomes damaged, you can replace the whole OCS if you have authorization from the ACS belonging to that Security World.
You can only replace OCSs that were created by Security Worlds that have the OCS/softcard replacement option enabled. For more information, see OCS and softcard replacement. |
Using Operator Card Sets for high availability
If you cannot risk the failure of a smart card, but some keys must remain accessible at all times, you can create a 1/2 OCS.
Use the first card as the working card and store the second card in a completely secure environment. If the working card fails, retrieve the spare second card from storage, and use it until you re-create a new set of 2 cards (see [ReplacingOpCardSetKeys]).
You can only replace OCSs that were created by Security Worlds that have the OCS/softcard replacement option enabled. For more information, see OCS and softcard replacement. |
Using persistent Operator Card Sets
If you create a standard (non-persistent) OCS, you can only use the keys protected by that OCS while the last required card of the quorum remains loaded in the card reader. The keys protected by this card are removed from the memory of the hardware security module as soon as the card is removed from the card reader, which provides added security.
If you create a persistent OCS, the keys protected by a card from that OCS persist after the card is removed from the smart card reader.
This enables:
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The use of the same smart card in several hardware security modules at the same time
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Several users to load keys onto the same hardware security module at the same time.
The Security World Software maintains strict separation between the keys loaded by each user, and each user only has access to the keys protected by their OCS.
Keys protected by a persistent card are automatically removed from the hardware security module:
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When the application that loaded the OCS closes the connection to the hardware security module
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After a time limit that is specified when the card set is created
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When an application chooses to remove a key
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When the HSM is cleared. See Manually removing keys from an HSM for more information
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If there is a power loss to the module, for example, due to power outage.
Some applications automatically remove a key after each use, reloading it only when required. Such applications do not benefit from persistent OCSs. The only way of sharing keys between hardware security modules for such applications is by having multiple smart cards in an OCS. |
Although the hardware security module stores the key, the key is only available to the application that loaded it. To use keys protected by this card in another application, you must re-insert the card, and enter its passphrase if it has one. Certain applications only permit one user at a time to log in, in which case any previously loaded persistent OCS used in that application is removed before the user is allowed to log in with a new OCS.
Manually removing keys from an HSM
You can manually remove all keys protected by persistent cards by clearing the hardware security module. For example, you could:
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Run the command
nopclearfail
--clear
--all
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Press the Clear button of the hardware security module (nShield Connect XC)
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Turn off power to the hardware security module (network-attached HSMs)
Any of these processes removes all keys protected by OCSs from the hardware security module. In such cases, all users of any applications using the hardware security module must log in again.
Persistence is a permanent property of the OCS. You can choose whether or not to make an OCS persistent at the time of its creation, but you cannot change a persistent OCS into a non-persistent OCS, or a non-persistent OCS into a persistent OCS.
A Security World can contain a mix of persistent and non-persistent card sets.
Using passphrases for extra security
You can set individual passphrases for some or all the cards in an OCS.
You can change the passphrase for a card at any time provided that you have access to the card, the existing passphrase, and a hardware security module that belongs to the Security World to which the card belongs.
Some applications do not support the use of passphrases. |
Maximum passphrase length
The maximum passphrase length limitation is not applicable to software versions before Security World Software v11.72. |
passphrases are limited to a maximum length of 254 characters, when using the following commands:
Other commands are unaffected.
You can still use and edit existing passphrases that are longer than 254 characters.
Prior to Security World Software v11.72, we set no absolute limit on the length of passphrases, although individual applications may not accept passphrases longer than a specific number of characters. Likewise, the Security World does not impose restrictions on which characters you can use in a passphrase, although some applications may not accept certain characters.
Entrust recommends that your password only contains 7-bit ASCII characters:
A-Z, a-z, 0-9, ! @ # $ % ^ & * - _ + = [ ] { } | \ : ' , . ? / ` ~ " < > ( ) ;
passphrase penalty timer
The HSM maintains a penalty time, measured in seconds and based on the number of failed PINs. Each failed attempt to enter a passphrase adds 4 seconds to the penalty time.
The penalty timer has a 14s penalty threshold, the first 3 failed passphrase verifications do not incur a penalty delay. Before verifying a passphrase, the HSM waits for the current penalty timer to be below 14s. The penalty time decays over time.
A HSM only has a small number of command processing threads, related to the kind of hardware in use (for example, 9 threads on an nShield Solo). Once all of these are waiting for a penalty to expire, any other submitted commands will be forced to wait. This can mean that even if penalty time isn’t large, the total delay experienced by clients may be substantial. |
Using softcard-protected keys
If you want to use passphrases to restrict key access but avoid using physical tokens (as required by smart-card protection), you can create a softcard-protected key.
A softcard is a file containing a logical token that you cannot load without a passphrase. You must load the logical token to authorize the loading of any key that is protected by the softcard. Softcard files:
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Are stored in
/opt/nfast/kmdata/local
(Linux) or%NFAST_KMDATA%\local
(Windows). -
Have names of the form
softcard_hash
(wherehash
is the hash of the logical token share).
Softcard-protected keys offer better security than module-protected keys and better availability than OCS-protected keys. However, because softcard-protected keys do not require physical tokens to authorize key-loading, OCS-protected keys offer better security than softcard-protected keys.
The passphrase of a softcard is set when you generate it, and you can use a single softcard to protect multiple keys.
Softcards function as persistent 1/1 logical tokens, and after a softcard is loaded, it remains valid for loading its keys until its KeyID
is destroyed.
NVRAM key storage (network-attached HSMs)
Application keys protected by an nShield network-attached HSM are stored in an encrypted format and copied automatically to the remote file system. A hardware security module, such as an nShield HSM, and/or an OCS protects the keys, as described in the preceding sections. You can also store application keys within the nonvolatile memory of a suitable hardware security module.
NVRAM-stored keys are encrypted in exactly the same way as application keys that are protected by the unit. The encrypted application key on the unit is replaced by a file containing the name of the NVRAM file that contains the application key. This file allows applications to use NVRAM-stored keys in the same way as keys stored in the remote file system. You can protect an NVRAM-stored key with either the Security World or an OCS.
NVRAM-stored keys differ from standard application keys only in their storage location. They still require protection by the unit or an OCS. |
Use of an NVRAM-stored key is the same as for any other key protected by an nShield HSM Security World.
NVRAM key storage:
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Offers no additional security benefits above those offered by the standard Security World Software mechanisms
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Is available for only a limited number of keys
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Reduces a Security World’s ability to offer load-balancing and recovery
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Requires backup and recovery procedures in addition to any that you implement for data stored on the client computer.
Do not store keys in NVRAM unless you must do so to satisfy regulatory requirements. |
NVRAM key storage was introduced only for those users who must store keys within the physical boundary of a hardware security module to comply with regulatory requirements. NVRAM-stored keys provide no additional security benefits and their use exposes your ACS to increased risk. Storing keys in nonvolatile memory also reduces load-balancing and recovery capabilities. Because of these factors, we recommend you always use standard Security World keys unless explicitly required to use NVRAM-stored keys.